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Abstract 
Public procurement has become exciting for labour lawyers. With the adoption of three new ‘revised 
and modernised’ directives on public procurement in 2014, whose express aims include enabling 
‘procurers to make better use of public procurement to support common societal goals’, labour 
lawyers need to start taking procurement law seriously. At a time when the EU and domestic 
legislative cupboard in the social field is pretty bare, public procurement may offer a lever to deliver 
social change. This article will explore some of the potential offered by procurement law to achieve 
employment law objectives. 
A. Introduction 
A local authority, let’s call it Borsetshire County Council (BCC), has a number of contracts with 
private providers for facilities management such as cleaning, catering and highways maintenance. It 
is conscious that staff turnover with these providers is high, pay is low, and staff are provided with 
little or no training. A number of accidents have occurred in the workplace. BCC is suspicious that 
the contractors are not providing sufficient staff to do the work properly, nor are those staff 
receiving their full entitlement to paid leave. BCC also thinks that some of its contractors are not 
paying the taxes and national insurance contributions that are due. Morale is low among the 
contract staff and, as a result, the service the local council receives is poor and users are 
complaining.  
BCC therefore decides to revise its procurement processes, introducing a socially responsible 
procurement policy.1 This means that it will require all successful contractors: 
(1) to pay the UK living wage to all staff, including the under 25s, fulfilling any contract with 
BCC;  
                                                            
*My sincere thanks go to Sue Arrowsmith, Chris Bovis, Sjoerd Feenstra, Alberto Sanchez Graells, Amy Ludlow, 
Josephine Mitchell and Grith Skovgaard Øllyke for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, to the two 
anonymous referees, and to the participants in the seminar ‘Procurement and precarity’ hosted in Cambridge 
on 13 May 2015, funded by the Philomathia foundation,and to James Robinson for some particularly helpful 
insights from practice. 
1 In Scotland, CAs likely to have significant procurement expenditure must have a procurement strategy  
including a statement of the authority’s general policy on, inter alia, the payment of a living wage to persons 
involved in producing, providing or constructing the subject matter of regulated procurements, promoting 
compliance by contractors and sub-contractors with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974  and any 
provision made under that Act, and the procurement of fairly and ethically traded goods and services ((s.15 
Procurement (Reform) Scotland Act 2014)). See also the Statutory Guidance on the Selection of Tenderers on 
the award of contracts: Addressing Fair Work Practices, including the Living Wage, in Procurement 
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0048/00486741.pdf. 
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(2) to provide evidence of adequate staffing levels for each contract, and the identity of 
those staff. Further, a certain percentage of the staff must have, as a minimum, NVQ level 3 
qualifications or equivalent, and that the remaining staff be offered the opportunity to train 
to this level or above;  
(3) to guarantee that no staff be employed on zero hours contracts (ZHCs);  
(4) to ensure that employment laws are being complied with by the contractor and 
subcontractor in respect of the staff performing the contract, especially in respect of paid 
annual leave, and that a safe system of work is provided.  
Further, BCC plans to exclude any economic operators from the procurement process if BCC 
discovers they have not paid their taxes or social security contributions. For good measure, and in 
recognition of the high levels of unemployment among the over 50s in its locality, especially among 
the ethnic minority community, BCC says it will give preference to contractors owned by ethnic 
minorities. In addition, it will require that all contractors ensure that at least 10% of all of their new 
hires, not just those working on the BCC contract, are over 50. It also wishes to give preference to 
contractors who recognise trade unions (it believes that union recognised workplaces have higher 
standards of health and safety). Finally, it wants guarantees from its suppliers that none of the 
products they buy have been made using child labour.  
Some of BCC’s requirements concern the tendering entity itself (eg preference for ethnic minority 
contractors), and some the production of supplies (eg non-use of child labour). The majority relate 
to the performance of the contract. Some of these performance conditions apply to all firms 
operating in the UK (eg compliance with labour law, including the Working Time Regulations 1998). 
Some exceed what the law requires (eg payment of the UK living wage). The remainder go beyond 
general compliance with the law and focus instead on so-called ‘special’ or ‘additional’ requirements 
relating to the contract workforce (eg quality of staff, training, hiring of local unemployed, 
recognised trade union).2 The question is whether any or all of these requirements imposed by BCC 
are compatible with EU – and thus domestic - law.  
The answer to this question has become clearer with the adoption of the EU’s 2014 legislative 
package. The package has three elements: 
 Directive 2014/23/EU on the award of concession contracts3  
 Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement4, and  
 Directive 2014/25/EU on utilities5 
The procurement package has the express objective of making better use of public procurement ‘in 
support of common societal goals’, including protection of the environment6, promoting innovation, 
                                                            
2 These distinctions are based on S. Arrowsmith, ‘A taxonomy of horizontal policies in public procurement’ in S. 
Arrowsmith and P. Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and 
New Directions (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
3 OJ [2014] L94/1.http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.094.01.0001.01.ENG 
4 OJ [2014] L94/65 
5 OJ [2014] L94/243.http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.094.01.0243.01.ENG 
6 Rec. 91 of 2014/24/EU says ‘This Directive clarifies how the contracting authorities can contribute to the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, whilst ensuring that they can 
obtain the best value for money for their contracts.’ 
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and social inclusion.7 As a crude indicator of the magnitude of the change in approach between the 
2004 and 2014 procurement directives, there are about 40 references to the word ‘social’ in the 
body of Directive 2014/24 (excluding annexes)8 as compared with four in the 2004 directive. 
We shall focus on the ‘General’ or ‘Public Contracts’ Directive 2014/24 (sometimes known as the 
‘Classic’ regime9). Although due to be implemented by 18 April 2016,10 the UK11 brought the 
Directive into force more than a year early (26 February 2015) by SI 2015/102 Public Contracts 
Regulations. A large number of the SI’s provisions are copied from the Directive, indicating that the 
Westminster government got much of what it wished for in negotiations. For this reason, it is 
thought likely that the UK will continue to apply the Regulations and thus the Directive post-Brexit, 
at least in the medium term.12 Helpfully, the Regulation numbers of SI 2015/102 coincide with their 
equivalents in the Directive.  
In this article I shall refer mainly to the Directive as the source of the rights but with reference to SI 
2015/102 where necessary. It will be argued that it is now much easier for contracting authorities 
(CAs),13 such as BCC, to require economic operators to comply with a range of social clauses. 
Although such an approach is not without risks, it will be argued that CAs need not only to find the 
courage to put these requirements in place but also to have a change in mindset. Procurement is no 
longer just about securing equal treatment of tenderers and transparency in the procurement 
process but it is also about delivering social (and environmental) objectives. 
The article is structured as follows. Section B outlines the changing attitudes towards social clauses 
in public procurement. Section C considers the general principles which apply in the case of all 
procurements falling within the General Directive. Section D looks at how the General Directive 
makes provision for social clauses at the different stages of the procurement process and, taking the 
BCC case as an example, examines how the Directive might apply to specific social clauses. Section E 
concludes. 
                                                            
7 See Rec.s 47 & 95 of 2014/24/EU and also COM(2011) 15. 
8 These figures exclude the number of times the Economic and Social Committee, social security, and Social 
services is mentioned. 
9 Member States are permitted to extend the scope of their national regimes beyond that required by EU law 
so long as it does not conflict with EU law.  England and Wales have done so by requiring the Open Procedure 
to be used and that an advertisement be put on Contracts Finder or Sell2Wales sites, down to very low value 
thresholds - see Part 8 of SI 2015/102.   
10 OJ [2014] L94/65.http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.094.01.0065.01.ENG 
11 The term UK will be used for simplicity. However, most of the Regulations do not extend to Scotland and 
there are limitations in respect of their application to Northern Ireland and Wales: Regs 1(7) and (8). An action 
may be ultra vires if it breaches EU law for Scotland (s. 57(2) Scotland Act 1998) and for Wales (s. 80(8) 
Government of Wales Act 2006).  In England, the position is that an action in breach of EU law should be 
disapplied. 
12 Although cf http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7213/CBP-7213.pdf, 39. 
13 Art. 2(1) provides that ‘“contracting authorities”’ [CAs] means the state, regional or local authorities, bodies 
governed by public law or associations formed by one or more such authorities or one or more such bodies 
governed by public law. Since the term CAs may be unfamiliar it will be used interchangeably with ‘state 
purchasers’. 
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B. Changing attitudes to social clauses in public procurement 
The power of the public purse to deliver social policy objectives has long been recognised in the UK 
and abroad. The argument goes that while governments must purchase responsibly and spend 
taxpayers’ money wisely, they also must look after the needs of their population, including those at 
risk of social exclusion. For this reason, procurement was used in the UK from the 1930s to the early 
1990s as a tool to provide targeted support to depressed regions.14 More generally, it has been 
argued that governments should use their purchasing power15 to set an example (what the French 
describe as l’état exemplaire),16 to influence the behaviour of the wider market17, and to create a 
level playing field for competitors based on compliance with the law. Those in favour of the strategic 
use of public procurement  therefore argue that procurement can serve not only a ‘purchasing 
function’ (allowing the state to purchase its needs) but also a ‘regulatory function’ providing a 
mechanism for enhancing compliance with social standards which more traditional mechanisms, 
such as individual enforcement, may have failed to ensure.18 They might even argue that public 
procurement can serve a prescriptive function, delivering on social standards beyond the minima 
laid down by the law. 
However, this view is not universally shared. Neo-liberals argue that the objective of procurement 
law is merely to ensure ‘efficiency’ ie to mandate outcomes that are as close as possible to those on 
the private market. For them, procurement should not be used to deliver social policies, certainly 
beyond what is required by law, because this would add cost and involve state purchasers ‘acting 
other than as a “rational” profit-maximiser’. They also argue that mandating social clauses is 
‘tantamount to “regulation by contract” which, like other forms of regulation, is thought to be 
inherently coercive and “inefficient”’.19 
The original EU public procurement directives of the 1970s did not take a clear position on this 
debate. Their aim was simply to open up the lucrative market in public procurement to potential 
bidders from across the EU, thereby (1) delivering opportunities for out of state contractors to 
compete on a level playing field with national providers for the provision of works, supplies and 
                                                            
14 For further detail see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005, 2nd ed, vol II), paras 19.2-19.12. Cf Case C-21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unità 
sanitaria locale No.2 di Carrara [1990] ECR I-889. However, compare this with Art. 107(3)(a) TFEU which allows 
state aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their 
structural, economic and social situation. 
15 The Commission says that 17% of the EU’s GDP is spent by public authorities: SEC (2010) 1258.  
16 The Scottish government expressly recognises this: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_Bills/Procurement%20Reform/b38s4-introd-pm.pdf, para. 63. 
17 See for example Office of Fair Trading paper OFT742b, September 2004, ‘Assessing the impact of public 
sector procurement on competition’. 
18 As the Commission put it in Buying Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement, SEC (2010) 1258 ‘By promoting SRPP [Socially Responsible Public Procurement], public 
authorities can give companies real incentives to develop socially responsible management. By purchasing 
wisely, public authorities can promote employment opportunities, decent work, social inclusion, accessibility, 
design for all, ethical trade, and seek to achieve wider compliance with social standards’. See further C. 
McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change (Oxford, OUP, 2007). 
19 These views are summarised and discussed by P. Kunzlik, ‘Neo-liberalism and EU Public procurement’ (2012-
3) 15 CYELS 283, 324. See also P. Kunzlik, ‘The 2014 Public Procurement Package. One Step forward and two 
back for green and social procurement’ in Y. Marique and K. Wauters (eds) EU Directive 2014/24 on Public 
Procurement – A New Turn for Competition in Public Markets? (Brussels,  Larcier, 2016). 
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services;20 and so (2) expose national providers to competition from out of state actors; in order (3) 
to deliver greater choice and better value for money for state purchasers and, ultimately, the 
taxpayer. Arrowsmith has described this as the ‘internal market’ view of the EU procurement law. 
Given their legal bases (Articles 53, 62 and 114 TFEU), she argues that the 1970s Directives were 
enacted to ensure that the classic mechanisms of ‘prohibiting discrimination, implementing 
transparency, and removing barriers to access’ applied to procurement.21  
The corollary of this internal market approach was that, given the relatively limited field occupied by 
the procurement directives and thus EU law, the regulation of ‘horizontal’ policies, such as social and 
environmental policies, was a matter for Member States.22 This basic division of competence 
coincided with the original settlement in the founding Treaties ( single market delivered by the EU, 
social policy  by the Member States23). However, it was never clear whether this division of 
responsibilities was, in fact, recognised and supported by the EU institutions,24 especially the Court 
of Justice which ruled in the late 80s/early 90s that social clauses could breach EU law.25 The Court’s 
fear was that by allowing Member States to exercise their discretion to deliver horizontal policies 
through procurement, they might (and in fact did26) operate policies which favoured local producers, 
thus contravening the general principle of non-discrimination in EU law.27  
The Court’s decisions generally paved the way for an increasingly restrictive approach towards using 
public procurement as a social tool, especially by the Commission’s DG Internal Market, now DG Gro. 
The Commission increasingly took the neo-liberal line that the objective of the EU Directives was in 
fact merely to ensure ‘efficiency’,28 An understanding which increasingly fitted the view of a number 
of Member States, including the UK.29  
Yet some Member States (particularly in Scandinavia and the Netherlands30) persisted with social 
procurement and were eventually aided by the Court which tried to restrain some of the more 
extreme, restrictive approaches proposed by the Commission.31 For example, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais32 
the Court said the Directive did ‘not preclude all possibility for the contracting authorities to use as 
[an award] criterion a condition linked to the campaign against unemployment provided that that 
                                                            
20 S. Arrowsmith, ‘The Purposes of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for 
National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal procurement Policies’ (2011-12) 14 CYELS 1, 26. 
21 Ibid, 2. 
22 Ibid, 46. 
23 C. Barnard, ‘EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: The Past, the Present and the Future’ 
(2014) 67 CLP 199. 
24 See further S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Policy as a Tool of Policy and the Impact of Market Liberalisation’ (1995) 
111 LQR 235. 
25 See eg Case C-360/89 Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-3401. 
26 See eg Case 45/87 Commission v Ireland (Dundalk Water tender) [1988] ECR 4929; Case C-21/88 Du Pont de 
Nemours Italiana SpA v. Unità sanitaria locale No.2 di Carrara [1990] ECR I-889 but cf Case 1/87 Beentjes 
[1988] ECR 4635.. 
27  
28 For an example of the Commission’s restrictive view, see COM(2001) 566, especially p.15. 
29 For a more recent example, see ‘Danish government uses the EU as argument against work clauses’, 
ugebreveta4.dk, 4 Mar. 2015. 
30 For an example of a network of authorities interested in social and environmental innovation in 
procurement, see the Dutch based http://www.procuraplus.org/. 
31 See eg Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 64. 
32 Case C-225/98 Commission v France (Nord Pas de Calais) [2000] ECR I-7445. 
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condition is consistent with all the fundamental principles of [Union] law, in particular the principle 
of non-discrimination…’.33 This suggested that the Court thought horizontal ‘special’ or ‘additional’ 
requirements clauses were lawful. However, the Commission subsequently offered the narrowest 
reading of the ruling:34 special requirements could be used but only as award criteria (rather than 
selection criteria) and exclusively in relation to the subject-matter of the contract. This difference of 
approach generated considerable problems and forced practitioners to take a ‘very conservative 
approach’ to avoid projects becoming ‘mired in legal uncertainty’.35 
However, the Nord Pas de Calais case (and Concordia Bus36 on environmental policy) did ultimately 
provide some impetus for change. The 2004 public procurement directives, notably the General 
Directive 2004/18,37 allowed for the recognition of horizontal policies, especially at performance 
stage. This view was confirmed by the Court in its seminal decision in Commission v The Netherlands 
(Fair trade),38 concerning the use of the organic and fair trade labels EKO and MAX HAVELAAR. Yet, it 
was the Lisbon Treaty 2009 that provided the Constitutional trigger for broader change, especially 
the new Article 3(3) TEU identifying a ‘social market economy’ as one of the objectives of the 
Union.39 Article 3(3) TEU made clear that social interests were no longer secondary to the economic 
aims of the EU,40 a theme picked up by the Commission in its 2010 guide to Buying Social.41  The 
same year saw the adoption of the EU2020 strategy, where public procurement was identified as 
‘one of the market-based instruments’ to achieve the EU2020 strategy of ‘smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’ ‘while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds’.42  
In the UK, despite the continued existence of s.17 of the Local Government Act (LGA) 1988 which 
prohibits local authorities from taking non-commercial factors43 into account in procurement, 
various state purchasers especially in Scotland44 and Northern Ireland,45 have adopted increasingly 
‘social’ approaches to procurement, especially using contractual clauses promoting equality as part 
                                                            
33 Para. 50. 
34 General Report 2000 - Chapter IX: Community law, para. 1119. It still repeated this caveat in its 2010 Buying 
Social Guide, above n. 17, p. 40.  
35 B. Doherty, ‘The United Kingdom’, Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities and Paradoxes, The 
XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, 2014, 792 discussing twenty procurement contracts in Northern Ireland 
which had a special condition requiring the employment of the unemployed, an equality issue under s.75 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 since Catholics in Northern Ireland were twice as likely to be unemployed as 
Protestants 
36 See eg Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki [2002] ECR I-7213. 
37 OJ [2004] L134/114.  
38 Case C-368/10 EU:C:2012:284, para. 76. 
39 For a discussion of this term, see C. Joerges and F. Rödl, ‘“Social Market Economy” as Europe’s Social 
Model?’ EUI Working Paper Law No. 2004/8. 
40 See AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:245, para. 51. See also the horizontal 
clauses, Art. 8 TFEU on equality between men and women, the new Art. 9 TFEU on the promotion of ‘a high 
level of employment … and a high level of education, training and protection of human health’, and Art. 10 
TFEU on non-discrimination. 
41 See eg Commission, above n. 34. 
42 Rec. 2 of the General Directive.  
43 Such as the terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers or the composition of, the 
arrangements for the promotion, transfer or training of or the other opportunities afforded to, their 
workforces – see s.17(5)(a). This legislation does not apply to Northern Ireland. 
44 See above n. 1. See also http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/Procurement/policy/corporate-
responsibility/CSR/SSPAP/ComBen. 
45 Doherty, above n. 35, 789-793. 
7 
 
of the public sector equality duty.46 The Local Government Act 1999 did introduce the duty of best 
value for local authorities which includes overall value, including economic, environmental and 
social value, when reviewing service provision.  
Finally, the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 more overtly supports an increasingly ‘social’ view 
of procurement (and so necessarily qualifies s.17 LGA 198847). It places an obligation on all public 
authorities to consider, at the pre-procurement stage, how a service (not works or goods) being 
procured might improve, inter alia, the social well-being of an area and how the authority can carry 
out the procurement process to achieve that improvement.48  
Given this background, how has the promotion of social matters manifested itself in concrete terms 
in the General Directive 2014/24 and thus the Regulations? The winds of change can be seen most 
obviously in the general principles of procurement. 
C. General principles 
Article 18(1) contains the classic principles of procurement: ‘Contracting authorities shall treat 
economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and 
proportionate manner.’ Then, crucially for labour lawyers, comes the new Article 18(2): 
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that in the performance of public 
contracts economic operators comply with applicable obligations in the fields of 
environmental, social and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective 
agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in 
Annex X. 
The international social conventions identified in Annex X reflect the ILO’s eight core labour 
standards: 49 ILO Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to 
Organise), 98 (the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining), 29 (Forced Labour), 105 (the 
Abolition of Forced Labour), 138 (Minimum Age), 111 (Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation)), 100 (Equal Remuneration); and 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labour). 
                                                            
46 http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publication/buying-better-outcomes-mainstreaming-equality-
considerations-procurement-guide-public-authorities. 
47 S.17(11) LGA 1988. S.17 has also been amended to accommodate the public sector equality duty (see 
s.17(10) LGA 1988). 
48 The Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 contains a similar  sustainable procurement duty in s.9 which 
provides that before carrying out a regulated procurement, the CA must consider how in conducting the 
procurement process it can ‘improve the economic, social, and environmental wellbeing of the authority’s 
area’, references to the wellbeing of the authority’s area include, in particular, reducing inequality in the area. 
For large contracts (£4m plus), there is a community benefit requirement relating to training and recruitment, 
or the availability of subcontracting opportunities, or relating to the improvement of the economic, social or 
environmental wellbeing of the authority’s area in a way additional to the main purpose of the contract (s.24). 
49 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-
islamabad/documents/policy/wcms_143046.pdf. The Annex X list can be amended by delegated act adopted 
under Article 56(4). Noticeable by its absence is ILO Convention No. 94 on labour clauses (public contracts). For 
discussion of Convention No.94, see ILO, ‘Labour Clauses in Public Contracts: Integrating the Social Dimension 
into procurement policies and practices’, 97th session, 2008. See also E. Van den Abeele, ‘The Reform of the 
New EU public procurement rules open door for better social and environmental protection’, ETUI working 
paper, 16 Nov. 2014. 
8 
 
The ‘labour law’ clause in Article 18(2) is an important innovation.50 It is drafted in mandatory terms 
(‘Member States shall take appropriate measures’) and in general terms (‘social and labour law 
established by Union law, national law, collective agreements’). And the reference to collective 
agreements is general: unlike the limitations laid down in the Posted Workers Directive 96/71,51 
there is no condition that the collective agreement be universally applicable nor is there any 
requirement, that, for example, pay be set only at the minimum rate. The only limitation is that 
Article 18(2) applies ‘in the performance of public contracts’. However, Recital 40 goes further52 and, 
reflecting the language of Commission v Germany (occupational pensions),53 suggests that account 
should be taken of social (and environmental) provisions throughout the performance of the 
procurement process.  
The UK has decided not to implement Article 18(2) as such, although Article 18(2) is referred to in 
various provisions of its Regulations.54 Rather, it will adopt guidance, due to be published shortly,55 
making it policy to mirror these obligations in contract clauses backed up by a standard contract 
condition.56 We shall return to Article 18(2) below. 
D. The Stages in a Procurement Process and the use of social 
provisions 
There are multiple stages in a procurement process: preparation, technical specification, publishing 
the OJEU notice, bidder selection, bidder ‘down-selection’, award, standstill and debriefing, contract 
completion and then contract performance. We shall focus on the stages at which there is potential 
to take social matters into account. 
1. Preparation stage 
The Directives do not, as such, apply to the preparation stage. Fundamentally, the decisions of 
whether to purchase, what to purchase and which state body will do the purchasing are left to 
Member States. However, the definition of what is being purchased is crucial in deciding what the 
contract is for. This is especially important when determining whether a particular condition can be 
justified as ‘linked to the subject matter of the contract’ (see below).57 
The 2014 General Directive encourages state purchasers to undertake preliminary market 
consultations with a view to preparing the procurement and informing economic operators of their 
                                                            
50 The ILO Conventions had been referred to in Rec. 33 to the 2004 Directive. 
51 OJ [1997] L18/1. 
52 The Court certainly takes the recitals into account to ‘elucidate’ the substantive provisions of the Directive: 
Case C-368/10 Fair Trade EU:C:2012:284, para. 85. 
53 Case C-271/08 [2010] ECR I-7091. 
54 The UK has ratified all eight core labour Conventions: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102651. 
55 Email on file with the author. 
56 Cabinet Office, Consultation Document: UK Transposition of new EU Procurement Directives, 19 Sept 2014, 
22. 
57
 In training procurers in sustainable procurement, the Scottish government suggests that people consider 
risk and opportunities arising for commodity groups and define the subject matter of the contract as a means 
of clear linkage to social and environmental aims.  Scotland has a lot of (non-procurement) policy to support 
this approach, principally the National Performance Framework and National Outcomes 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Performance/scotPerforms/outcome). 
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plan and requirements.58 This may include prior involvement of candidates or tenderers so long as it 
is done in a fair way so that those consulted do not get more useful information than other eventual 
bidders.59 In the case of services, these consultations create the opportunity for contracting 
authorities (CAs) in England and Wales to consider social value under the 2012 Act, and how it might 
be factored into the tender.  
The preparation stage also allows CAs to consider whether the contract benefits from a ‘set-aside’ ie 
it can be reserved for a particular group of suppliers. Building on the 2004 Directive, Article 20(1)  
provides that Member States may reserve participation in procurement to a) sheltered workshops; 
b) economic operators whose main aim is the social and professional integration of disabled or 
disadvantaged persons; or c) sheltered employment programmes, provided that in all three cases at 
least 30 % (down from ‘most’ in the 2004) of the employees are disabled or disadvantaged workers. 
This new reference to ‘disadvantaged workers’ includes the ‘unemployed, members of 
disadvantaged minorities or otherwise socially marginalised groups’60 such as the Roma and older 
workers, groups which have long been identified in the EU’s employment strategy as needing special 
support.61  
The set-aside envisaged by the Directive is only partial: procurement rules still apply to such 
contracts but only organisations meeting the Article 20 criteria can bid. 62 This does, however, mean 
that disadvantaged groups from other Member States may win the contract. 
2. Technical specification stage 
The technical specification stage requires contracting authorities to identify what they want to 
procure, namely ‘the characteristics required of a works, service or supply’ (Article 42(1)) and to set 
out the minimum specifications.63 Even prior to the 2014 Directive, the Commission had said that it 
was possible at this stage to specify in a contract for works, measures to avoid accidents at work and 
specific conditions for storage of dangerous products in order to safeguard the health and safety of 
workers.64 This is of relevance to BCC in respect of, for example, any contracts it wishes to award in 
respect of highway maintenance, catering in schools or cleaning. As with the 2004 Directive, the 
2014 Directive makes provision for CAs to insist upon accessibility criteria for people with disabilities, 
but the obligation now is more robust.65  
                                                            
58 Article 40.  It was implicitly permitted previously (Case C-21/03 Fabricom SA v. Belgian State [2005] ECR I-
1559) and utilised by some CAs without problems but the lack of legal uncertainty around it caused many CAs 
to shy away from this helpful step. 
59 Article 41 which refers to avoiding distortions of competition and violations of principles of non-
discrimination and transparency. 
60 See also Rec. 36. 
61 See eg Guideline 7 of the Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States Council Dec. 
2010/707 (OJ [2010] L308/46) which have been repeated annually since then. See also 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm. 
62 Article 20(2) adds: ‘The call for competition shall make reference to this Article.’  
63 Article 45 allows CAs to authorise or require tenderers to submit variants. While the variants must also be 
linked to the subject matter of the contract, this possibility might create space for innovative use of social 
policies. 
64 See above n. 41, 29. 
65 Art. 42(1), fourth and fifth subparas. 
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Most striking and important is the recognition of the possibility for CAs to specify PMPs (process or 
methods of production), namely criteria concerning the production of supplies but which have no 
effect on the characteristics of the product, supplies which are then used by the winning bidder in 
the performance of the contract.66  
Article 42(1) provides that the characteristics of the works, services or supply may  
refer to the specific process or method of production or provision of the requested works, 
supplies or services or to a specific process for another stage of its life cycle even where such 
factors do not form part of their material substance, provided that they are linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract and proportionate to its value and its objective’.67 
So, for example, the CA might specify in a contract to procure coffee that the coffee is purchased at 
a fair price and under fair conditions from small scale producers in developing countries. 68  
But the criteria for CAs to be able to specify PMPs are strict. First, PMPs can be used only where they 
are linked to the subject matter of the contract. This takes us back to the vexed question of what is 
the subject matter of the contract (which is for BCC to define). In the case of a CA wishing to buy 
coffee from fair trade sources it would be sensible to define the subject matter of the contract as the 
purchase of ‘fair trade coffee’.69 But what about BCC’s requirement that its supplies – say 10,000 
uniforms for staff - must not be produced using child labour? What is the subject matter of the 
contract? If it is narrowly construed as ‘uniforms’, then it is hard to argue that the non-use of child 
labour makes any difference to what is being purchased (uniforms) and so the requirement that (not 
using child labour) is not linked to the subject matter of the contract and so cannot be applied. One 
way round this would be to say that too narrow a reading would deprive Article 42(1) of its effect,70 
especially since Article 42(1) expressly recognises that the PMPs do not need to form part of the 
material substance of the contract. Another would be to argue that given the reputational damage 
resulting from buying uniforms made by child labour, then ‘not using child labour’ is part of the 
subject matter of the contract.  
                                                            
66 PMPs that did affect the characteristics of the product (eg running costs, re-use, recycling or disposal costs) 
had been allowed prior to the 2014 Dir. Case C-368/10 Fair Trade EU:C:2012:284 (decided after the publication 
of the Commission’s proposal for the 2014 Dir. but before their adoption had accepted the legality of PMPs 
which had no effect on the characteristics of the product). See further P.  Kunzlik, ‘From Suspect Practice to 
Market-based Instrument: Policy Alignment and the Evolution of EU Law’s Approach to ‘Green’ Public 
Procurement (2013) 22 Public Procurement Law Review 97.  
67 Article 42(1), emphasis added. 
68 These were the facts in Case C-368/10 Fair Trade EU:C:2012:284, paras. 73-6 but were not allowed then as 
technical specifications, only as performance conditions. 
69 Since this requirement goes directly to bidder price for this tender (because it is an obligation in this tender 
to avoid cloth and manufacturing facilities which are cheaper because they avoid the PMP requirement).  As 
the PMP requirement can be demonstrated to go to price, it should be seen as part of the subject matter of 
the contract. 
70 A further possible route would be to draw an interpretative steer from the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, in particular Article 24 (the rights of the child) and Article 32 (prohibition of child labour). This might 
persuade the Court to construe ‘uniforms not using child labour’ as the subject matter of the contract. See, by 
analogy, Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien Vertriebs GmbH v Avides Media AG [2008] ECR I-505. The fact that 
potential suppliers must be excluded from bidding if they have been convicted of using child labour might 
support this reading of the subject matter of the contract. See also Art. 57(1)(f) considered below. 
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A final route is to adopt a broader reading of the phrase ‘linked to the subject matter of the 
contract’, namely that BCC can specify ‘not using child labour’ as a requirement but that this 
requirement applies only to the supply of uniforms to it, BCC (ie linked to the subject matter of BCC’s 
contract); it cannot insist that all clothing provided by the successful supplier to all of its purchasers 
not be made using child labour.  
Having considered the first limitation on the use of PMPs (linked to the subject matter of the 
contract), we turn now to consider the second limitation on the use of PMP specifications: the PMPs 
must be proportionate to the contract’s value and its objectives. It can be difficult to put every PMP 
in monetary terms. The difference in price in using ‘Fair Trade’ and un-accredited coffee can be 
identified and considered because both are available options within the marketplace. It is much 
harder to monetarise the prevention of child labour if, as is hoped, child labour is not available in the 
market. A strict approach to the proportionality principle could therefore result in the deliberate 
change to Article 42 being undermined. This cannot have been the intention of the legislation.  
There are other limitations which apply to all technical specifications including but not limited to 
PMPs.  Specifications must afford equal access to the procurement procedure and must not have the 
effect of creating unjustified obstacles to the opening up of procurement to competition.  These are, 
effectively, a requirement to state the specifications in the most neutral way which can be achieved.  
This is particularly important in IT projects where, for example, if the language or operating system 
on a server are specified unnecessarily, a significant part of the market may be excluded. 
Article 43 allows the CA to require a specific label as means of proof71 that the works, services or 
supplies correspond to the required social characteristics.72 So labels could relate to workforce 
issues (eg fair trade labels). The label requirements must, however, satisfy a number of criteria, 
including, again, that they be linked to the subject-matter of the contract, that the requirements are 
based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria, that the label is awarded by a body 
independent of the supplier applying for the label and that equivalents are accepted.   
3. Supplier selection stage 
3.1 Introduction 
Having determined what it wants to buy and specified the detail of what it is purchasing, the CA then 
needs to consider the characteristics of the potential supplier. This stage is essentially backward-
looking: what has the supplier done in the past as an indicator of its capability and its suitability to 
fulfil the current contract? This is assessed by suppliers completing the Pre Qualification 
Questionnaire (PQQ). The Directive deals with two situations:  
(1) verification of the supplier’s capacity to fulfil the contract (ie capability criteria: 3.2); and 
(2) (bad) things which the supplier has done which may or must lead to the exclusion of the 
contractor (ie suitability criteria: 3.3).   
A bidder which fails selection will be excluded. Even if a bidder does not fail selection it may still be 
‘down-selected’ to make the award process more manageable for the CA (3.4).  
                                                            
71 This confirms Case C-368/10 Fair Trade EU:C:2012:284, para. 64. 
72 See also Rec. 75.  
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There have been examples where mandatory elements at the selection stage have been used 
covertly to give preference to a local provider. As a result, the selection stage is tightly controlled. 
The lack of flexibility is not necessarily a problem for BCC as selection is only about excluding bidders 
who cannot perform the contract.  Subsequent stages give more flexibility to BCC to reflect its values 
so that, even when a bidder is not excluded on selection, their bid will score in a way which reflects 
BCC’s concerns about social factors (see below). 
3.2 Selection Criteria 
Article 58 concerns ‘selection’ criteria: 
 suitability to pursue the professional activity;  
 economic and financial standing;  
 technical and professional ability. 
These criteria concern the supplier’s ability to deliver the specific contract, namely minimum levels 
of capacity to be met by suppliers in order to qualify to participate in the procurement competition. 
Account cannot be taken here of the supplier’s general policies on, for example, equal opportunities. 
This view is supported by Fair Trade73 where the Court said that (what is now) Article 58 
‘exhaustively lists the factors on the basis of which the contracting authority may evaluate and 
assess the technical and professional abilities of tenderers’ (emphasis added). On the facts, the CA 
used the requirement of respect for the criteria of sustainable purchasing and socially responsible 
business as a selection criteria. This was unlawful because it was not connected with any of the 
Article 58 criteria.  
Article 58 of Directive 2014/24 has not created very much more space for incorporating social 
factors into the selection criteria than existed under the 2004 Directive. However, it does provide 
that, with regard to technical and professional ability, CAs may impose requirements ensuring that 
economic operators possess the necessary human and technical resources and experience to 
perform the contract to an appropriate quality standard. Thus, Article 58(4) would suggest that BCC 
can impose requirements that the economic operator needs to have adequate staffing levels and 
those staff must be adequately qualified for the job. 
In its Procurement (Reform) Act 2014 the Scottish government goes further. S.29 expressly gives 
powers to Scottish Ministers to publish guidance (to which CAs must have regard) about the 
selection of economic operators and the award of contracts in relation to a regulated procurement 
which may cover matters relating to: 
(i) the recruitment, remuneration (including payment of a living wage) and other terms 
of engagement of persons involved in producing, providing or constructing the 
subject matter of the regulated procurement, and 
                                                            
73 Case C-368/10 Commission v Netherlands EU:C:2012:284, para. 105-8. See also Case C-31/87 Beentjes [1988] 
ECR 4635, para. 28 (lowest tender rejected because the tenderer could not comply with the requirements that 
the contract workforce be comprised of 70% long-term unemployed; not lawful ground for exclusion because 
not listed in Directive). 
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(ii) employee representation including trade union recognition,74 
Subsection (i) allows Ministers ‘to address current known workforce related issues, for example, 
inappropriate use of zero hours contract, whilst retaining the flexibility to respond quickly to future 
issues’.75 Such provisions may make the job of socially progressive councils, like BCC, easier in 
Scotland than in England and Wales. 
3.3 Exclusions 
While Article 58 concerns eligibility criteria set by CAs for the individual procurement competition, 
Article 57 details the grounds on which an economic operator can or must be excluded even where 
they satisfy the eligibility criteria. The exclusions serve a disciplinary and reputational function. They 
are disciplinary in that they contain a significant sanction for misconduct by potential bidders.76 They 
also serve to protect the reputation of the CA, ensuring that the CA is not associated with illegal 
conduct.77  
The Directive allows for exclusions in two cases. First, there are the mandatory exclusions.78 These 
now include, in Article 57(1)(f), the situation where the contracting authority has established that 
that the economic operator has been the subject of a ‘conviction by final judgment’ for ‘child labour 
and other forms of trafficking in human beings as defined in Article 2 of Directive 2011/36/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council’.  
Of particular relevance to BCC is that the CA must also now exclude a contractor where it is aware 
that ‘the economic operator is in breach of its obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social 
security contributions and where this has been established by a judicial or administrative decision 
having final and binding effect in accordance with the legal provisions of the country in which it is 
established or with those of the Member State of the contracting authority’.79 However, the 
Directive allows Member States to provide a derogation from this mandatory exclusion ‘where an 
exclusion would be clearly disproportionate’, for example where only minor amounts of taxes or 
social security contributions are unpaid.80 
                                                            
74 See also the Scottish government’s PQQ: http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Government/Procurement/buyer-
information/standardformsanddocs/sPQQ0214. 
75 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_Bills/Procurement%20Reform/b38s4-introd-pm.pdf, para. 90. 
76 See eg Rec. 101. 
77 See eg http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_Bills/Procurement%20Reform/b38s4-introd-pm.pdf, para. 86. 
78 These exclusions can occur at any stage during the procedure (Art. 57(5), first para). 
79 Art. 57(2) and Rec. 100 (emphasis added). There is also a discretionary exclusion (see below) where the CA 
can demonstrate that the economic operator has not paid its taxes or social security contributions but where 
no legally binding decision has been taken (Art. 57(2), second para). The mandatory and discretionary 
exclusions cease to apply (Art. 57(2), third para) when the economic operator has paid the money due, 
together with any interest or fines, or entered a binding arrangement to do so. Art. 57 therefore concerns 
‘ongoing default, not past violations’ (S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in 
the EU and UK, vol. 1, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2014, 3rd ed), 12-93, although she suggests that non-
payment of taxes and social security contributions may still constitute grave misconduct (12-94) under Art. 
57(4)(c). For an example of where such an exclusion might apply, see 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/dec/07/saatchi-cleaners-fight-unpaid-wages-low-pay.  
80 Article 57(3), building on Case C-358/12 Consorzio Stabile Libor Lavori Pubblici v. Comune di Milano 
EU:C:2014:2063. See also Rec. 101, second para., on the importance of the proportionality principle. The UK 
has given CAs the choice to do this: Reg 56(7). 
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Secondly, there are the discretionary grounds for exclusion81 which generally concern the suppliers’ 
‘professional honesty, solvency and reliability’.82 Article 57(4)(a), which is new, allows the CA to 
exclude a potential bidder where it can demonstrate by any ‘appropriate means’ (thus not 
necessarily only tribunal proceedings) a violation of applicable obligations referred to in the labour 
law clause in Article 18(2). Despite not implementing Article 18(2) itself, the UK has given effect to 
Article 57(4)(a).83 This is of relevance to BCC in its attempts to combat non-compliance with the 
Working Time Regulations 1998 and the National Minimum Wage Act 1998: it has the discretion to 
exclude bidders whom BCC can sensibly demonstrate have not complied with the law.84 
Article 57(4)(a) is a robust provision but its very robustness creates a problem.  It may mean that an 
employer, who has lost an employment tribunal claim for, say, sex or race discrimination or unfair 
dismissal, or even potentially against whom the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) has received 
a complaint, could be excluded from contracting. While this might create a significant incentive for 
compliance with labour law generally (the requirement not to breach labour laws is not confined to 
those involved in fulfilling the contracts), any CA adopting such an approach may be at a real risk of 
being challenged on whether its decision to remove is disproportionate and/or breaches the general 
principles of procurement laid down in Article 18(1).85   
So far, however, the indications are that the Courts may back exclusion. Exclusion of a bidder has 
been approved by the courts where the bidder refused to sign a document confirming it had no links 
with organised crime86; where the bidder had been fined for being in a competition cartel87; where a 
bidder had paid €276 of monthly social security fees late in relation to a procurement competition 
for a maintenance contract worth nearly €4.8 million 88; and where a bidder failed to promise to pay 
host workers the legal minimum wage in the country of operation89.  Not all of these cases relate to 
exclusion under Article 57(4)(a) but they do appear to indicate that the threshold for the CA to be 
acting disproportionality may be a difficult one to exceed.  
Article 57(4)(c) allows the CA to exclude a potential bidder where the CA can demonstrate by 
appropriate means that the economic operator is guilty of grave professional misconduct which 
renders its integrity questionable.90 Recital 39 makes clear that non-compliance with collective 
agreements ‘could be considered grave misconduct on the part of the economic operator 
                                                            
81 These exclusions can occur at any stage during the procedure (Art. 57(5), second para). 
82 Case C-226/04 La Cascina Soc. coop. arl and Zilch Srl v Ministero della Difesa and Others [2006] I-1347, para. 
21. 
83 Reg. 57(8)(a) which refers to ‘a violation of the applicable obligations referred to in regulation 56(2)’ which 
in turn refers to the text of Art. 18(2) and to Annex X of the Public Contracts Directive. 
84 There is also now an express provision on suppliers who have shown ‘significant or persistent deficiencies in 
the performance of a substantive requirement’ under a previous contract which might include non-compliance 
with social clauses (Art. 57(4)(g)). 
85 Cf Art. 57(4)(c) which talks of ‘grave professional misconduct’. 
86 C-425/14 Impresa Edilux ECLI:EU:C:2015:721. 
87 C-470/13 Generali-Providencia Biztosító Zrt v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2469. 
88 C-358/12 Consorzio Stabile Libor Lavori Pubblici v. Comune di Milano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2063  
89 C-115/14 RegioPost ECLI:EU:C:2015:760. 
90 This might also cover non-compliance with special conditions in the past: see AG Gulmann’s Opinion in Case 
C-71/92 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-5923, para 95. 
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concerned’.91 There may be some overlap between Article 57(4)(c) and Article 57(4)(a) but the 
political push for a stronger and more visible social dimension resulted in Article 57(4)(a) being 
introduced as a separate provision.92  
However, while Article 57(4)(a) and (c) create opportunities for BCC, Article 57(6) draws some of the 
teeth of the provision. It makes explicit provision for the slate to be wiped clean (‘self-cleaning’) in 
the case of both mandatory and discretionary exclusions: 
Any economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 may 
provide evidence to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient 
to demonstrate its reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such 
evidence is considered as sufficient, the economic operator concerned shall not be excluded 
from the procurement procedure.93 
Such evidence might include payment in compensation, changes in personnel, appropriate staff 
reorganisation measures, and the implementation of reporting and control systems.94 It is thought 
that the need (ability?) to cleanse themselves may have precipitated companies which have 
blacklisted workers in the building industry to attempt to reach a settlement.95 
Nonetheless, the threshold for  ‘self-cleaning’ to be judged as ‘sufficient’ is high. The Directive 
requires that the bidder must prove a) that it has paid or undertaken to pay compensation in respect 
of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct; b) clarified the facts and circumstances 
in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities; and c) taken 
concrete technical, organisational and personnel measures that are appropriate to prevent further 
criminal offences or misconduct.96 The measures taken by the economic operators must be 
evaluated taking into account the gravity and particular circumstances.  Reasons must be given for 
any decision by the CA that the evidence is not sufficient. 
In the absence of self-cleaning, the maximum period of exclusion is 5 years from judgement in the 
case of mandatory exclusions, three years from the event in the case of discretionary exclusions and 
the Directive is clear that ‘self-cleaning’ is not a way of reducing any exclusion imposed by a court (as 
opposed to the CA excluding a bidder).97 
3.4 Reduction in the number of bidders 
Even if a bidder has made it through the PQQ, it may still be ‘down-selected’, as permitted by Article 
65 of the General Directive. This is done to make the process more manageable for the CA (and save 
bidders who have a low chance of winning at the award stage from incurring the costs of preparing 
an award stage submission in respect of the restricted procedure, the competitive negotiated 
                                                            
91 See also Rec. 101, first para. 
92 S. Arrowsmith, above n. 79, para. 12-101.  
93 The self-cleaning defence will not apply where the Court judgment requires the exclusion of the tenderer 
from participating in tendering processes. 
94 Rec. 102. 
95 Although cf http://www.gmb.org.uk/newsroom/blacklisting-compensation-not-enough. See also 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Government/Procurement/buyer-information/standardformsanddocs/sPQQ0214 
on the Scottish government’s approach to blacklisting. 
96 Article 57(6) 2nd and 3rd paragraphs 
97 Art. 57(7). 
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procedure and the competitive dialogue (CD) procedure). The minimum number of bidders 
permitted is five for the Restricted procedure and three for the Negotiated and CD procedures.98  
Down-selection must use the wider-range of award criteria (see below) and not the selection 
criteria.99  
 4. Award stage 
4.1 MEAT 
The next stage of the procurement process is the ‘award’ of the contract. This is a misnomer because 
it means choosing the winning bid, not entering the contract with the eventual winner (known as 
completion).  The concept of MEAT (the ‘most economically advantageous tender’), which was used 
in the previous Directive, is now the overarching criterion to choose a winner.100 Article 67(2) 
explains: 
The most economically advantageous tender from the point of view of the contracting 
authority shall be identified on the basis of the price or cost, using a cost-effectiveness 
approach, such as life-cycle costing in accordance with Article 68,101 and may include the 
best price-quality ratio, which shall be assessed on the basis of criteria, including qualitative, 
environmental and/or social aspects, linked to the subject-matter of the public contract in 
question. (emphasis added) 
Award criteria, unlike PQQ selection criteria, are not bright line ‘yes/no’ criteria. Bidders are scored 
against the award criteria which allow bidders to fine-tune their bids between price and quality.  The 
costs/benefit decisions for a bidder ( ‘Should I offer the more expensive but better’ 
person/material?) are often a core element of the difference between bids.  Accordingly, there is 
more flexibility for BCC to design criteria to bring out its preference for stronger social standards 
(e.g. because a bidder will score more quality points per pound expended than other elements so 
they become a cheaper way to improve the quality, and thus the overall score, despite costing 
more).  
In Fair Trade102 the Court had already made clear that CAs were authorised to choose the award 
criteria based on considerations of a social nature but these could concern only the persons using or 
receiving the works, supplies or services which were the object of the contract. This is now reflected 
in part in Article 67(2) which says that the criteria for assessment may comprise, for instance ‘(a) 
quality, including  … accessibility, design for all users, social, environmental and innovative 
characteristics and trading and its conditions’. Article 67(2) also confirms in paragraph (b) that the 
award criteria cover ‘organisation, qualification and experience of staff assigned to performing the 
contract’ but only ‘where the quality of the staff assigned can have a significant impact on the level 
                                                            
98 In an Open procedure, no reduction of the number of bidders is permitted.  This reflects the fact that, 
although every Open procedure is able to require that PQQ selection criteria are met, a huge majority of all 
Open procedure tenders are on the basis of price alone. 
99 Article 66 
100 Article 67(1). 
101 See also Rec. 96 ‘methodology on social life cycle costing should be examined, taking into account existing 
methodologies such as the Guidelines for Social Life Cycle Assessment of Products adopted within the 
framework of the United Nations Environment Programme.’ 
102 Case C-368/10 Commission v Netherlands EU:C:2012:284, para. 85. 
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of performance of the contract’103. As Recital 94 puts it, this might be the case, for example, in 
contracts for intellectual services such as consultancy or architectural services104. The Recital 
continues that CAs making use of this possibility should ensure, by appropriate contractual means, 
that the staff assigned to contract performance effectively fulfil the specified quality standards and 
that such staff can only be replaced with the consent of the contracting authority which verifies that 
the replacement staff affords an equivalent level of quality. 
The emphasis on quality - which would help BCC in its drive to ensure qualified staff are doing the 
job - can also be seen in Recital 92. It says that in the context of the best price-quality ratio, CAs 
should be encouraged to choose award criteria that allow them to obtain high quality works, 
supplies and services that are optimally suited to their needs. This may justify a CA insisting on good 
working conditions. For good measure, Recital 93 says that it is still possible to assess value for 
money on the basis of other factors than price, such as ‘environmental or social aspects, or whether 
the social integration of disadvantaged persons or vulnerable groups amongst the persons assigned 
to performing the contract has been furthered.’  
Two (controversial) limitations on using social clauses at the award stage have been carried over 
from the 2004 Directive into Article 67(1): (1) consideration of the MEAT must be seen from the 
point of view of the CA, and (2) the social criteria must be linked to the subject matter of the 
contract. These limitations might make it difficult to argue that the successful bidder must have, say, 
good equal opportunities policies in place since often this may not be economically advantageous 
from the point of view of the contracting authority and may not be linked to the subject matter of 
the contract. However, the Court of Justice has taken a broad view of requirement (1) (consideration 
of MEAT from the perspective of the CA). It has said that CAs may use criteria that are not of a purely 
economic nature in a monetary sense, including ecological criteria.105  
Criteria (2) on linkage to the subject matter of the contract has, according to Arrowsmith, ‘rule[d] 
out many criteria relating to secondary policies, such as human rights, social or environmental 
policies’.106 This point was emphasised by the Commission in its Buying Social Communication:107 in a 
works contract for building a school ‘the labour conditions of the workers building the school cannot 
be part of the subject matter of the contract, as they are not linked to the object of the contract, but 
only to the way in which the procurement contract will be performed’. Later it gave an example of a 
contract to build a hospital. It says it is not possible to use as an award criterion the creation of new 
jobs on the local market because such a criterion is not linked to the subject matter of the contract 
(construction of the hospital) and such a criterion is discriminatory.108 The Commission did, however, 
                                                            
103 Emphasis added. This resolves some of the uncertainty generated by Case C-532/06 Lianakis AE v 
Alexandroupolis [2008] ECR I-251, although cf Annex XII, Part II (f) ‘the educational and professional 
qualifications of the service provider or contractor or those of the undertaking’s managerial staff, provided 
that they are not evaluated as an award criterion. 
104 A similar approach has recently been approved under the previous Directive 2004/18/EC for a contract 
which was ‘intellectual in nature’ and the criterion was clearly testing the ‘professional merit’ of bidders 
towards identifying the most economically advantageous tender: see C-601/13 Ambisig ECLI:EU:C:2015:204 
105 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 55, Case C-448/01 EVN & Wienstrom v. Republik 
Osterreich [2003] ECR I-1452, paras. 31-34. 
106 Above n.13, para. 7.103. See also Case C-448/01 EVN & Wienstrom v. Republik Osterreich [2003] ECR I-1452. 
107 Above n. 18, 23. 
108 Ibid, 38. 
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accept that criteria going beyond the subject-matter of the contract could be applied but only in the 
single situation of a tie-breaker.109 
However, these examples and the narrower view of ‘linkage’ discussed above (in section 2) now 
need to be read in the light of the new Article 67(3) which contains some key changes: 
Award criteria shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter of the public contract 
where they relate to the works, supplies or services to be provided under that contract in 
any respect and at any stage of their life cycle, including factors involved in: 
(a) the specific process of production, provision or trading of those works, supplies or 
services; or 
(b) a specific process for another stage of their lifecycle 
even where such factors do not form part of their material substance. (emphasis added) 
Article 67(3) clarifies two issues. The first concerns the question of linkage itself. Article 67(3) seems 
to envisage a looser connection (‘relates to’) between the award criteria and the subject-matter of 
the public contract. This view is supported by Recital 97 which says that the condition of a link with 
the subject matter of the contract excludes criteria and conditions relating to general corporate 
policy. It also says that CAs should not be allowed to require tenderers to have a certain corporate 
social or environmental responsibility policy in place.110 If this is all that is ruled out, then this may 
well open the way for greater use of social criteria which are related to the subject matter of the 
contract.  
The case law interpreting the 2004 Directive also points in this direction. In EVN111 the award criteria 
looked at the total amount of electricity produced from renewable sources which the tenderer was 
able to supply in general and not the amount which the tenderer would be able to supply specifically 
to the CA. The Court of Justice said that the award criterion was not linked to the subject matter of 
the contract. By contrast, in Fair Trade112 a different set of facts allowed the Court to rule that 
because the social award criteria (organic and fair trade) covered only the ingredients to be ‘supplied 
in the framework of that contract, without any bearing on the the general purchasing policy of 
tenderers’ those criteria did relate to products, the supply of which constituted part of the subject-
                                                            
109 See the Commission’s Guide on Buying social, above n. 17, 40. This will prevent the Commission challenging 
on the point (because it cannot go against its issued guidance during the validity of that guidance) but it will 
not protect a CA (before national courts or on a reference to the CJEU) if the Commission is judged to be 
wrong in law.  
110 It would still be legitimate to include a requirement to have a social responsibility policy for the part of the 
business performing the contract but this may work only if there is some degree of clarity between facilities or 
people used on the contract and those not used on the contract.  It is simply nothing to do with the CA 
whether the bidder also uses that policy in other situations. However, if the bidder has regular or multiple 
public sector contracts, it becomes easier for the bidder to implement the policy in respect of all staff than 
worry whether the correct resources are covered at any particular time. In this way BCC’s requirement for the 
bidder to have a particular policy for that which is relevant to its contract can be a powerful tool if it 
accidentally encourages the bidder to improve its policies across the board. 
111 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus [2002] ECR I-7213, para. 59 first established this principle which was more 
clearly articulated in Case C-448/01 EVN & Wienstrom v. Republik Osterreich [2003] ECR I-1452. See also Case 
C-234/03 Contse v Insalud [2005] ECR I-9305, para. 68 and the Commission’s Buying Social Communication, 
above n. 34, 43. 
112 Case C-368/10 Fair Trade EU:C:2012:284, para. 90 (emphasis added). 
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matter of the contract.113 For good measure, the Court added that ‘there is no requirement that an 
award criterion relates to an intrinsic characteristic of a product (ie which forms part of the material 
substance of the product). Therefore the criterion could refer to the fact that the product concerned 
was of fair trade origin.114 This is now reflected in the language of Article 67(3) (‘in any respect and at 
any stage of their life cycle’ (emphasis added). 
This broader view of linkage is also the position adopted by the UK government115 which notes that 
‘award criteria must be contract-specific rather than aimed at assessing the corporate policy of the 
tenderer eg that it would be wrong to award extra points to a supplier that supplied fair trade 
products to all its suppliers’.116 It is supported by Kunzlik, too, who says CAs ‘may not use their 
purchasing power to express approval or disapproval of the conduct of particular firms in ways 
unrelated to the thing being purchased’.117 
So returning to the BCC example, the analysis of Article 67(3) would suggest that BCC can use, as an 
award criteria, special conditions relating to employment of a certain percentage of the unemployed 
over 50s,118 but that condition can apply only in respect of the BCC contract, not in respect of all of 
the contractor’s new hires in general.119 However, award criteria giving preference to firms owned 
by ethnic minorities, as BCC would like, would not be allowed since the ownership of the firm is not 
linked to the delivery of the contract itself. More difficult would be a maintenance contract for social 
housing which provides for additional community benefits as part of the award criteria (eg that the 
maintenance staff should keep a watchful eye over the elderly residents and help them with odd-
jobs).120 It is not clear whether the additional community benefits would be considered related to 
the subject matter of the contract (a contract which is for maintenance), although the broad reading 
or careful specification might allow points for such additional social criteria. 
                                                            
113 Emphasis added. 
114 Ibid, 91. 
115 See also the decision of the French Conseil d’Etat (ECLI:FR:CESSR:2013:364950.20130325, para. 4). In a call 
for tenders for maintaining roads and green areas, the Isère departmental council required that a certain 
number of people excluded from the labour market be used to fulfil the contract. The Grenoble administrative 
court cancelled the call for tender on the basis that ‘labour market insertion’ efforts were not directly related 
to the subject-matter of the contract and so could not be used as contract-award criteria by the local 
authority. However, the Conseil d’Etat ruled that the contract, by its nature, could be implemented by people 
with a disadvantaged position on the labour market (at least partially), and that therefore the link between the 
tenderer’s performance in social insertion efforts and the subject-matter of the contract existed. 
116 Crown Commercial Service, ‘Reform of the EU Procurement rules – public sector, briefing for Procurement 
Practitioners, 2014, 75. In a similar vein, on performance condition, it says that the conditions cannot relate to 
actions by the supplier unrelated to that contract (eg employment conditions of the supplier’s workforce on 
contracts for other customers) (p.79). 
117 P. Kunzlik, ‘Neo-liberalism and EU Public procurement’ (2012-3) 15 CYELS 283, 320. 
118 There is, however, a further issue concerning age discrimination under Dir. 2000/78 OJ [2000] L33/16 but 
Art. 6(1), specifically (a) on the integration of older workers, does allow direct discrimination to be objectively 
justified provided it is proportionate. Cf Case C-144/04 Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. 
119 Article 67(3) is less clear as to whether workforce criteria can be used, such as using a certain number of 
people with disabilities or long-term unemployed or older workers (as BCC wants). However, the reference to 
‘factors …not form[ing] part of their [the works, services or supplies’] material substance’ would suggest that 
this is now possible, a view confirmed by the extensive references to social facts in the recitals (see eg Rec. 99). 
120 I am grateful to Sue Arrowsmith for this example. It might be possible to include such a requirement as a 
technical specification but it would still be subject to the same limitation of needing to be related to the 
subject matter fo the contract. 
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Where social award criteria are to be used, this must be made clear upfront. As the Court said in 
Nord Pas de Calais121 ‘an award criterion linked to the campaign against unemployment must be 
expressly mentioned in the contract notice so that contractors may become aware of its existence’. 
Such an interpretation would fit with the ‘internal market’ view of the Directives: that they are there 
to ensure transparency in the tendering process but not to regulate every aspect of what is being 
procured. Article 67(5) of the Directive also requires the CA to specify in the procurement 
documents the relative weightings it gives to each of the criteria chosen to determine MEAT, while 
Article 67(4) makes provision for verification so that, for example, BCC can check whether the 
tenderer’s staff do in fact have NVQ level 3 qualifications. 
4.2 Grounds for not awarding tenders 
There are two legal grounds on which tenders, even if most economically advantageous, may or 
must not be awarded. First, Article 56(1), second paragraph, provides that CAs may decide not to 
award a contract to the tenderer submitting the MEAT where they have established that the tender 
does not comply with the applicable obligations referred to in Article 18(2) (the labour law clause).122  
Second, in respect of tenders which appear abnormally low, Article 69(1) provides that CAs must 
require economic operators to explain the price or costs proposed in the tender where the tender 
appears to be abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services.123 Article 69(2) adds that 
these explanations may relate to compliance with obligations referred to in Article 18(2) and Article 
71 (on subcontracting) (see below). Article 69(3) provides the CA must assess the information 
provided by consulting the tenderer. It continues that CAs ‘shall reject the tender, where they have 
established that the tender is abnormally low because it does not comply with applicable obligations 
referred to in Article 18(2)’,124 no matter how economically advantageous it might be.125 The need to 
ask the bidder who has submitted the abnormally low bid to explain and for the CA carefully to 
consider that explanation is an essential for due process.  126 
This is a potentially powerful provision. There is some (so-far anecdotal) evidence that contractors 
may be winning contracts by not paying holiday pay to their staff. The unpaid holiday pay constitutes 
the profit margin on the contract. The introduction of tribunal fees in 2013 has meant that the costs 
associated with going to tribunals may well deter individuals from enforcing their rights to holiday 
pay.127 Such practices, if discovered before the award (possibly following a tip off by a 
whistleblower?), will now cause the tender to be rejected by a CA such as BCC. Likewise, if BCC 
discovers that the reason why an economically attractive tender for cleaning is because the tenderer 
proposes a lower number of workers than is appropriate to the area to be cleaned, the minimum 
number of workers/hours having been specified in the tender documents, then the tender may be 
                                                            
121 Case C-225/98 Commission v France (Nord Pas de Calais) [2000] ECR I-7445, para. 51. 
122 Article 56(1) forms part of the general principles that apply to Articles 67-69 on award criteria. This has 
been implemented in the UK Regs including the rules on Article 18(2): Reg. 56(2) 
123 This confirms Case C-599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko a.s. and Others v Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie 
EU:C:2012:191, para. 33. 
124 See also Rec. 103. 
125 The UK has implemented these provisions by reference to Reg. 56(2): Reg. 69(2)(d) and (5). 
126 Reg. 69, SI 2015/102. 
127 See C. Barnard and A. Ludlow, ‘Enforcement of Employment Rights by EU-8 Migrant Workers in UK 
Employment Tribunals’(2016) 45 ILJ 1-28. 
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considered abnormally low and may be rejected; it must be rejected if the low relates to non-
compliance with Article 18(2).128 However, BCC must ensure that it has sensible evidence for its 
views as to how many staff are needed because BCC’s decision to reject the abnormally low tender 
must be ‘reasonable’ in a public law sense. Such evidence is, typically, available from the 
combination of all the other bids.129 
There is also a helpful procedural provision in Article 69(5): upon request, Member States must 
make available to other Member States, by means of administrative cooperation, any information at 
its disposal, such as laws, regulations, universally applicable collective agreements or national 
technical standards. A pilot project is now underway on the use of the multilingual internal market 
information system (IMI), an electronic database which allows competent authorities to exchange 
information transnationally.130 This system is already used for exchange of information in connection 
with the Enforcement Directive on Posted Workers 2014/67.131 Brexit raises issues for the UK’s 
continued participation in IMI. 
5. Performance stage 
5.1 Article 70 
In the past it was the performance stage which offered the greatest scope for including social factors 
in a contract. This was recognised by the Court in Beentjes132 and it was confirmed in Article 26 of 
the 2004 Directive: 
 Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a 
contract, provided that these are compatible with [Union] law and are indicated in the 
contract notice or in the specifications. The conditions governing the performance of a 
contract may, in particular, concern social133 and environmental considerations. 
The only two limitations in Article 26 of Directive 2004/18/EC on the use of special conditions 
relating to contract performance were that the conditions had to be: 
 compatible with [Union] law (ie it is no directly nor indirectly discriminatory134), and 
 indicated in the contract notice or in the specifications 
Some key changes have been introduced by Directive 2014/24/EU concerning the circumstances in 
which social criteria can be used at performance stage. Article 70 now provides: 
Contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a 
contract, provided that they are linked to the subject-matter of the contract within the 
meaning of Article 67(3) and indicated in the call for competition or in the procurement 
documents. Those conditions may include economic, innovation-related, environmental, 
social or employment-related considerations. (emphasis added) 
                                                            
128 Art. 69(3). See further Commission Buying Social communication, above n.18, 41. 
129 See further Case T-495/04 Belfass v. Council [2008] ECR II-00781. 
130 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/index_en.htm. 
131 OJ [2014] L159/11. 
132 Case 31/87 Beentjes v. State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635. 
133 See further Rec. 33 of Directive 2004/18. 
134 Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH EU:C:2015:760, para. 56. 
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The two limitations are now that: 
 the performance conditions must be linked to the subject-matter of the contract, and 
 indicated transparently in the call for competition or in the procurement documents. 
Thus, the Directive appears to have given with one hand (by broadening the range of special 
conditions to include social or employment-related considerations) but taken with another (by 
introducing the requirement that the performance conditions have to be linked to the subject of 
contract, albeit qualified by the more relaxed, ‘related to’ test identified in Article 67(3).135  
The Recitals suggest a generous approach to social considerations. For example, Recital 98 provides 
that contract performance conditions can favour the implementation of measures for the 
‘promotion of equality of women and men at work, the increased participation of women in the 
labour market and the reconciliation of work and private life, … and to comply in substance with 
fundamental International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions, and to recruit more 
disadvantaged persons than are required under national legislation’.136 Recital 99 adds that 
measures aimed at the protection of the health of the staff involved in the production process, the 
favouring of social integration of disadvantaged persons or members of vulnerable groups or 
training in the skills needed can also be the subject of award or performance criteria. This would 
support BCC with its aim to impose training requirements on successful economic operators. 
However, the contract will have to be of a fairly long duration if the training requirements include an 
obligation to provide apprenticeships. 
Any such requirements need to be non-discriminatory and proportionate (and otherwise in 
compliance with EU law although this is no longer expressly stated as it had been in Article 26 of 
Directive 2004/18). So a requirement that the successful bidder must hire the local unemployed, as 
BCC may insist, might cause particular problems since it may indirectly discriminate against non-
domestic firms. However, as I have argued elsewhere,137 indirect discrimination can be justified and 
the justification may relate to the EU’s other policy objectives such as those laid down in the EU2020 
strategy on raising employment, especially among older workers. Where the obligation to hire 
unemployed involves relatively small numbers, such a requirement may be proportionate. 
5.2 Article 18(2) of the Directive 
As we saw above, Article 18(2) of the Directive provides that Member States must take ‘appropriate 
measures’ to ensure that in the performance of public contracts economic operators comply with 
applicable social and labour law. This is a positive development for the enforcement of labour law. It 
builds on the (rather unknown) principle of procurement that the OJEU Notice and the procurement 
documentation will govern the performance of the contract procured under them.138  It is, however, 
                                                            
135 Para. 102. That said, the Commission maintains (above n. 34, 43) that the linkage requirement already 
existed under the 2004 Directive. 
136 For an example of the use of equality and diversity in procurement see the Transport for London 
East London Line project: http://www.rubensteinpublishing.com/default.aspx?id=1111206. See also 
content.tfl.gov.uk/single-equality-scheme-2012.doc 
137 C. Barnard, ‘British Jobs for British Workers’: The Lindsey Oil Refinery Dispute and the Future of Local 
Labour Clauses in an Integrated EU Market’ (2009) 38 ILJ 245. 
138 It is clear law that the OJEU scope binds the scope of performance of the contract as well as the scope of 
the procurement process and any post award but pre-signature negotiations – see Case C-496/99 P Succhi di 
Frutta [2004] ECR I-3801, paras 115-120. 
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unfortunate that the Directive did not expressly highlight and address the relationship between the 
new procurement regime and the Directive on transfers of undertakings 2001/23,139 which has 
caused problems for CAs in the past.140 It is also unfortunate that, as with early government 
attempts to use such labour law clauses,141 Article 18(2) is drafted in such a general way that it is 
unlikely to be specifically enforceable (ie it will not satisfy the requirement of direct effect).  All of 
this suggests that ultimately there was a lack of consensus on these key issues.  
What does Article 18(2) mean in practice? Where an economic operator from State A or State B has 
won a contract to provide services/works in Member State A and it will use State A’s residents to 
fulfil the contract, Article 18(2) requires the contractor to comply, as a minimum, with State A’s 
labour laws in respect of State A’s workers and those workers migrating to State A under Article 45 
TFEU.142 This so-called territorial (or equal treatment) approach to labour law has underpinned UK 
law: all UK labour law rules apply to those working in its territory irrespective of their nationality 
and, in principle, their length of residence. Where, however, the work is being done in State B to 
fulfil a service contract in State A, Bundesdruckerei143 makes clear that the CA in State A cannot insist 
that State A’s labour law rules apply since this would be contrary to Article 56 TFEU on free 
movement of services. The General Directive does not appear to affect this outcome.144  
The position is different where a State B contractor wins a contract in State A and plans to bring 
posted workers with it to fulfil the contract in State A. The Posted Workers Directive (PWD) 96/71,145 
as interpreted by the Court of Justice in Laval146 and Rüffert,147 makes it clear that the host state 
must require that posted workers benefit from national laws, but only in those areas listed in 
Articles 3(1)(a)-(g) PWD. This means that a host state CA (such as BCC) cannot insist that, where the 
contract is being fulfilled by posted workers, they must enjoy all of host state labour law; BCC can 
insist on compliance only with those host state rules listed in Articles 3(1)(a)-(g) PWD.148  
                                                            
139 OJ [2001] L82/16. 
140 See further A. Ludlow, ‘The Public Procurement rules in action: An empirical exploration of Social Impact 
and Ideology’ (2013-4) 16 CYELS 13. 
141 B. Bercusson Fair Wages Resolutions (London: Mansell Publishers), 1976. 
142 Rec. 37, first para. which talks about Member States and CAs taking the relevant measures to ensure 
compliance with the social and labour laws ‘at the place where the works are executed or the services 
provided’. 
143 Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund EU:C:2014:2235. 
144 This view seems to be confirmed by Rec. 37: ‘it is of particular importance that Member States and 
contracting authorities take relevant measures to ensure compliance with obligations in the fields of 
environmental, social and labour law that apply at the place where the works are executed or the services 
provided and result from laws, regulations, decrees and decisions, at both national and Union level, as well as 
from collective agreements, provided that such rules, and their application, comply with Union law’ (emphasis 
added). 
145 OJ 1997 L18/1. 
146 Case C- 341/05 Laval EU:C:2007:809. 
147 C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189. 
148 See also Rec. 37 second para. The ETUC has argued that since Laval/Rüffert predated the 2014 procurement 
package with its greater emphasis on social considerations, the case law should be reconsidered (ETUC, ‘New 
EU Framework on Public procurement: ETUC key points for the transposition of Directive 2014/24/EU’, ETUC, 
2014, heading 2.3). However, the various references to the PWD in the Recitals suggest that the EU legislature 
wished to confirm the case law of the Court, not undermine it, especially since the Posted Workers 
Enforcement Directive 2014/67 (OJ [2014] L 159/11) was being negotiated at the time and the decision had 
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In respect of pay, Article 3(1)(c) PWD says that the host state can insist that the posted worker be 
paid the minimum wage, as laid down by law, or by collective agreement which satisfies the 
conditions laid down in Article 3(8) PWD.149 So BCC could insist that a successful bidder which 
performs the contract using posted workers pay the UK national minimum wage and the national 
living wage.150  
What about BCC’s requirement to pay the UK living wage (not to be confused with the national living 
wage)? In the UK, the UK Living Wage (£8.25 outside London, £9.40 in London) is currently not 
legally binding,151 but a significant number of large employers have agreed to pay it. So BCC can 
probably impose a requirement on tenderers to pay the UK living wage in respect of local workers 
and migrant workers working in the UK under Article 45 TFEU. It may not be possible to require the 
UK living wage to be paid in respect of posted workers because Article 3(1)(c) PWD makes clear that 
host states can require posting companies to pay the minimum wage only, as laid down by law or 
collective agreement.152 This seems to be the intention of Recital 98 of Directive 2014/24: 
… the [the award criteria or contract performance conditions] should be applied in 
accordance with Directive 96/71/EC, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and should not be chosen or applied in a way that discriminates directly or indirectly 
against economic operators from other Member States or from third countries parties to the 
GPA or to Free Trade Agreements to which the Union is party. Thus, requirements 
concerning the basic working conditions regulated in Directive 96/71/EC, such as minimum 
rates of pay, should remain at the level set by national legislation or by collective 
agreements applied in accordance with Union law in the context of that Directive. 
However, as Laval153 made clear, Article 3(7) PWD allows posting companies to pay higher rates of 
pay if they so choose.154 While, at first sight, this seems unlikely, they may do so if they think it will 
(1) strengthen their hand in winning a contract, or (2) to maintain good industrial relations (as in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
been taken not to open up the substance of Dir. 96/71 (cf COM(2016) 128). However, the advent of Dir. 
2014/24 may provide some flexibility over specific matters such as a requirement to pay the living wage. 
149 Para. 71. 
150 In his 2015 budget, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a ‘national living wage’ – a 50p increase in 
the statutory minimum pay rate for the over-25s from April 2016, to £7.20 an hour (introduced through 
amendment to the NMW Regulations 2015), followed by a series of stepped increases expected to take the 
rate above £9 an hour by 2020. See Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH EU:C:2015:760, para. 66, where the Court 
upheld a minimum wage requirement even where the law applied only to public contracts. 
151 http://www.livingwage.org.uk/.  
152 While this might appear to go against the grain of the equal treatment principle established in Article 18(1) 
of Dir. 2014/24, an approach based on equal treatment was essentially rejected by the Court in Case C-346/06 
Rüffert ECLI:EU:C:2008:189 (although more nuanced in Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH EU:C:2015:760, albeit 
RegioPost concerned a minimum wage laid down by (local) law). The circle can be squared by arguing that the 
position of posted workers and those of national workers is not similar and so the principle of equal treatment 
is not engaged. 
153 Case C- 341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. 
154 Para. 81. 
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case of the Lindsey Oil Refinery 155) or, (3) to professionalise the sector (as experience in the cleaning 
sector has shown156). The costs of paying the living wage will, however, be passed on to the CA. 
Thus, while voluntary compliance with the living wage would satisfy the PWD, a mandatory 
obligation would not. Yet, as Koukiadaki shows,157 the reality is more complex. Although the UK 
Cabinet Office has been broadly against the imposition of the living wage, for fear of challenge under 
EU law,158 EU Commissioner McCreevy, in response to a question from Jean Lambert MEP, said 
‘Living-wage conditions may be included in the contract performance clauses of a public 
procurement contract provided they are not directly or indirectly discriminatory and are indicated in 
the contract notice or in the contract documents’.159 The response continues ‘In addition, [living 
wage conditions] must be related to the execution of the contract. In order to comply with this last 
condition, contract performance clauses including living-wage conditions must concern only the 
employees involved in the execution of the relevant contract, and may not be extended to the other 
employees of the contractor.’ In other words, it is possible to impose a requirement to pay the living 
wage but the requirement must be linked to the subject matter of the contract (in the broad sense 
of the phrase). 
Such a clear statement on its position on the living wage may suggest that the Commission is unlikely 
to bring enforcement proceedings against a state where the CA (such as BCC) has imposed a 
requirement that the supplier pays the living wage. However, the risk remains that an unsuccessful 
bidder might challenge such a requirement. Yet, such a challenge comes with a cost attached, and a 
risk that the contractor might sour the relationship with the CA in respect of future tenders. 
Koukiadaki reports no evidence of such legal challenges,160 in part because of the nature of the 
services involved (eg cleaning, catering) which, when combined with the geographic position of the 
UK (physically distant from the lower wage economies in Eastern Europe) means that such services 
are unlikely to be fulfilled by posted, as opposed to migrant, workers. 
5.3 Subcontracting 
Once BCC has decided on the social protections it is building into the contract that it is procuring, it 
must also think about sub-contracting. If it fails to do so, BCC might find that the main contractor will 
meet all the standards and policies required but then seeks to avoid them - to win with a cheaper 
price - through outsourcing the contract to a provider who has lower costs and does not meet the 
requirements. Those bidders who have followed the spirit as well as the letter of the specifications 
are likely to be concerned that they have been beaten on price by a provider who uses sub-
                                                            
155 C. Barnard, above n. 137. 
156 A. Koukiadaki, ‘The Far-Reaching Implications of the Laval Quartet: the case of the UK living wage’ (2014) 43 
ILJ 91, 108. 
157 A. Koukiadaki, above n.156, especially pp. 106-114. 
158 See also OGC, Procurement Policy Note – Quarterly Update (London OGC, 2009), 4. See also 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9656627/Downing-Street-says-Boris-Johnsons-living-wage-may-be-
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159 European Parliament, ‘Answer given by Mr McCreevy on behalf of the European Commission’, 11 March 
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contractors to circumvent (more expensive) requirements and may mount a legal challenge. It is 
accordingly essential and, it is argued, entirely proportionate (especially given the high legal costs of 
defending a formal challenge and the automatic freeze on signing the contract161) to leave bidders 
free to choose how they will deliver the contract (themselves or through sub-contracts) but to 
require them to ensure that all (or at least all important) sub-contractors meet the requirements as 
well.162 
Article 71 of Directive 2014/24 goes some way towards helping BCC deal with subcontractors. It 
introduces a new provision on subcontracting.163 It requires competent national authorities, such as 
labour inspectors or their equivalent, to take appropriate action to ensure that not only contractors 
but also subcontractors respect the labour law clause in Article 18(2).164 Article 71(6) provides that 
‘With the aim of avoiding breaches of the obligations referred to in Article 18(2) appropriate 
measures may be taken’.165 These include verifying whether there are grounds for exclusion of the 
subcontractors pursuant to Article 57 in which case the subcontractor must/may be replaced, or 
where the Member States provides for a mechanism of joint liability, they must ensure that the 
relevant rules are applied in compliance with Article 18(2). 
The rest of Article 71 is about transparency: enabling the relevant authorities to know exactly who is 
on, for example, a building site or doing the highway maintenance. Thus, Article 71(2) provides that, 
in the procurement documents, the CA may ask the tenderer to indicate in its tender any share of 
the contract it intends to subcontract to third parties and any proposed subcontractors. Article 71(5) 
provides that in the case of works contracts and in respect of services to be provided at a facility 
under the direct oversight of the CA, the CA must require the main contractor to indicate the name, 
contact details and legal representatives of its subcontractors involved in such works or services, in 
so far as known. 
E. Conclusions 
For a local council, like BCC, the General Directive provides the green light for social creativity in 
procurement and a strong indication that the EU – and the European Commission in particular - far 
from being a threat will in fact now be supportive of targeted social initiatives.166 The Scottish 
government has long pushed at the frontiers of what can be delivered through social 
procurement.167 This is particularly visible in its Procurement (Reform) Scotland Act 2014. CAs, like 
BCC in other parts of the UK, have now been empowered by Directive 2014/24 to follow. There are 
some good precedents: Network Rail, for example, has a ‘Code of Conduct for Labour’ which 
                                                            
161 See Regulation 95 of SI 2015/102 
162 I am grateful to James Robinson for this point. 
163 See also the UK’s Crown Commercial Services Guidance on the New Subcontracting Provisions, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transposing-eu-procurement-directives. 
164 Art. 71(1). See also Rec. 105. 
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establishes ‘some minimum standards that we expect in our supply chain’.168 It continues ‘We must 
work to achieve our vision of everyone going home safe everyday. That will mean we often have to 
go beyond this baseline’.169 And they make the economic case too: ‘Outstanding safety performance 
and business performance go hand in hand’.170 
However, delivering on a social agenda requires a certain amount of courage and determination 
from Member States. As the UK government notes, ‘Often we have been over-conservative and risk 
averse in approaches to procurement’.171 Directive 2014/24 sends out a strong signal that this needs 
to change and the UK government has recognised this. However, this view is not universally shared. 
There are still some who argue that strategic or smart use of public procurement can generate 
market distortions and so advocate a strict proportionality test to the promotion of horizontal 
procurement policies. 172 Proportionality is a principle that many in government are afraid of, due to 
its very indeterminacy and the lack of certainty ex ante.  
For these reasons, social procurement  requires courage from CAs like BCC since it is they who risk 
being sued by unsuccessful bidders, not the states themselves. Further, as Doherty notes, the 
institution of an automatic stay on the procurement process has ‘encouraged more litigation on 
procurement matters’.173 This view is supported by empirical research conducted by Arrowsmith and 
Craven.174 Their questionnaire data reveal a ‘steady rise of incidents of suppliers seeking legal advice 
from solicitors firms’ relating to violations of EU procurement law. The recession seems to have 
aggravated this trend somewhat. However, in the ‘overwhelming majority’ of cases no legal 
challenge results. Reasons for this include time limits for bring claims, the costs and time involved in 
bringing a claim, that the CA has already taken remedial corrective action (such as rewinding the 
procedure), fear of reprisals by the CA (although less than in the past), and uncertainty about the 
legal case. More reassuringly for BCC, Arrowsmith and Craven found that ‘a limited role for the 
damages remedy in public procurement disputes’, given the ‘very limited number of successful 
damages claims in court actions’.175 For this reason, socially minded CAs should welcome Directive 
2014/24. Yes, it creates some uncertainty but, more generally, it empowers CAs to boldly go. 
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172 A. Sanchez Graells, ‘Truly Competitive Public Procurement as a Europe 2020 Lever: What Role for the 
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173 B. Doherty, above n.34, 796. 
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Other settlement agreements must exist because few of the procurement challenges have proceeded all the 
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